UK Rejects Gambling Affiliate Licensing. Would Another Licence Really Improve Compliance?
The government's rejection of a separate affiliate licence puts the focus back on operator cooperation and advertising enforcement rather than new paperwork.

The UK government has decided, once again, that gambling affiliates do not need their own licence. In its response to a House of Lords report published on 19 November 2026, it rejected proposals to bring affiliate publishers directly under the Gambling Commission’s licensing regime.
The reasoning is familiar. Affiliate marketing is already covered by advertising rules, and licensed gambling operators are responsible for the third parties promoting their products. The government argues that adding another licensing system would increase costs and complexity without necessarily making gambling safer.
In its formal response, the government warned that additional duties for the Gambling Commission “would likely lead to regulatory duplication”.
We tend to agree. Having dealt with gambling affiliate licensing in the United States, we have seen how much administration it can create without necessarily improving the information consumers receive. But the decision raises a question. If the aim is responsible advertising and accurate information, is licensing really the most effective way to achieve it?
Existing oversight
Operator responsibility
Licensed gambling operators are responsible for their affiliates’ advertising compliance, supported by advertising rules, contractual requirements and monitoring.
Proposed addition
Direct affiliate licensing
Affiliates would also need a Gambling Commission licence, with direct regulatory accountability, a public register and a possible kitemark.
What would affiliate licensing actually improve?
The House of Lords Liaison Committee had proposed a separate licensing regime for gambling affiliates, administered by the Gambling Commission.
Licensed affiliates would be permitted to promote only licensed gambling operators, and social media companies could verify their status and potentially display it through a kitemark. The proposal also considered holding both operators and affiliates accountable for breaches.
There is some merit in this. A public register could make legitimate publishers easier to identify, and direct licensing would give the Gambling Commission another way to hold affiliates accountable. However, it is less clear what practical problems this would solve that existing rules cannot already address.
In the UK, licensed operators are responsible for the affiliates they work with. They can impose contractual requirements, monitor promotional activity and terminate partnerships when those requirements are not met.
We believe this commercial relationship can provide more effective day-to-day oversight, provided it works as intended. The operator controls the gambling product and its terms, while the affiliate communicates that information to potential customers. Both have an interest in keeping content accurate, though they don’t always succeed.
Keeping gambling offers accurate is an ongoing challenge
For gambling publishers like us, one of the most frequent changes concerns welcome offers and the conditions attached to them. A bookmaker might adjust its free bet bonus, change the qualifying deposit, introduce new wagering requirements or remove an offer altogether. These changes can happen regularly, sometimes with little notice.
More fundamental product changes, such as switching sportsbook platform providers or significantly altering the selection of casino game suppliers, generally happen less frequently. They affect review quality, but promotional terms require much more regular attention.
Ideally, operators should notify affiliates before promotional changes take effect, allowing publishers to update their reviews, comparison tables and other marketing content. In practice, this does not always happen. In our experience, operators with whom we have an active commercial relationship send regular notifications. Even then, updates can arrive late, sometimes after the new terms have already taken effect. Other operators may change their promotions without notifying us, leaving us to discover the changes ourselves.
This creates a genuine compliance problem. An affiliate can make every effort to publish accurate information, but maintaining that accuracy becomes difficult when operators don’t communicate changes to their promotions.
Affiliates still must independently verify their information. However, operators are best positioned to communicate changes before they happen.
Better cooperation could achieve more than another licensing requirement. Clearer contractual responsibilities, timely communication and accessible, up-to-date promotional terms would make a practical difference.
Technology may also help close the gap. AI-assisted monitoring could increasingly let publishers regularly check operator websites and promotional terms, identify changes, and flag outdated information for editorial review. Instead of manually checking hundreds of offers, publishers could focus on verifying the changes these systems identify. This already happens to some extent.
Such tools would not eliminate the need for human checks. Promotional terms can be complex, and offers may vary by market or customer group. Automated monitoring can also miss changes or misinterpret them. Nevertheless, combining operator communication with independent, AI-assisted monitoring could speed up identifying and correcting inaccurate information. This would address a practical compliance problem that licensing alone would not solve.
What our experience with US licensing tells us
Our experience with gambling affiliate licensing and registration across multiple US states has made us sceptical about adding further publisher-side requirements. Depending on the jurisdiction and type of authorisation, the procedures can involve extensive paperwork, repeated declarations, signatures, background checks and fingerprinting.
Fingerprinting is a good example. We have encountered fingerprinting and personal declaration requirements as part of US gambling licensing procedures, despite our business focusing on publishing information and referring customers to licensed operators.
We understand the purpose of background checks, and regulators have legitimate reasons to establish who owns and controls businesses in the gambling industry. But repeating extensive declarations and, in some cases, fingerprinting procedures every few years feels disproportionate for a publisher that reviews licensed gambling products. It is difficult to see how these procedures improve the accuracy of our content or provide better information to consumers.
The same applies to some of the documents and declarations required during the licensing process. At times, collecting signatures and completing administrative procedures feel like objectives in themselves, with little consideration of what those requirements are supposed to achieve.
For smaller affiliate businesses operating across several jurisdictions, the cumulative burden can be considerable.
It also raises a proportionality question. Should a publisher that reviews licensed sportsbooks and refers customers to them face procedures resembling those applied to businesses that actually operate gambling products? The activities differ, as do the associated risks. We have not seen convincing evidence from our own experience that this administrative burden produces more accurate reviews, more responsible advertising or better-informed customers.
That does not mean licensing achieves nothing. Background screening and direct regulatory accountability serve purposes beyond ensuring promotional accuracy. But the benefits must justify the requirements, especially when the businesses being regulated do not operate gambling products themselves. The UK would be wise to consider that distinction before introducing a similar system.
The problems licensing would not necessarily solve
Two recent Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) rulings illustrate why the discussion should focus on actual advertising practices.
In September, the ASA upheld a complaint against Smart Gravity Ltd after a casino comparison advert appeared in response to a search for “help with gambling”. In October, the ASA issued a similar ruling against Optival Ltd, whose betting comparison advert appeared after a search for “self exclusion bookies”. Both companies said they did not intentionally target those searches and referred to measures intended to prevent inappropriate placements. Nevertheless, the ASA found that their advertising breached its rules.
These cases concern advertising targeting rather than outdated promotional information, but they illustrate a similar point: compliance cannot be reduced to having the correct policies or procedures on paper. Would requiring these affiliates to hold a licence have prevented those adverts from appearing? Possibly, if licensing resulted in more effective monitoring and enforcement. But the existing advertising rules already provide grounds for taking action.
A more useful question is whether businesses have adequate safeguards and whether failures lead to meaningful corrective measures.
Another challenge is the promotion of unlicensed gambling operators. The existing UK model relies heavily on licensed operators to police their commercial partners. That mechanism is less effective when an affiliate promotes an offshore operator with no UK licence.
A licensing register could help distinguish legitimate affiliates from those operating outside the regulated market. But a publisher already willing to promote illegal gambling services may simply ignore the licensing requirement.
The Gambling Commission’s November 2026 illegal gambling data identified 97 affiliate web pages linking to illegal gambling websites in September alone. This figure reflects its monitoring activity rather than a complete market count.
97
Affiliate web pages linking to illegal gambling websites identified in September 2026 alone
Gambling Commission, illegal gambling data, November 2026
We have also encountered lookalike websites appearing in Google searches for closed UK casino brands, using familiar brand names to attract British customers to other gambling sites. We have reported examples of these websites, yet some remained visible when we checked again. This seems a far more immediate consumer-protection concern than introducing another licensing requirement for established publishers already working with regulated operators.
This is a different enforcement challenge. More effective cooperation with search engines, advertising platforms and payment providers may achieve more than imposing additional obligations on businesses already working with licensed operators.
Better oversight does not necessarily mean more licensing
Licensing can establish accountability, support due diligence and give regulators direct powers over businesses that would otherwise be difficult to supervise. There are legitimate reasons for these measures, especially in an industry involving consumers’ money and the risk of gambling-related harm.
But every additional requirement should have a clear purpose and a demonstrable benefit.
For gambling affiliates, much of the everyday work of responsible marketing depends on accurate product information, effective communication, and operators’ and publishers’ willingness to correct problems when they arise.
We would prefer to see the UK build on the existing relationship between operators and affiliates, supported by meaningful contractual responsibilities, independent advertising oversight, and stronger enforcement when the system fails.
Independent oversight remains essential. But we would rather see regulators focus on enforcing existing standards and addressing identifiable problems than introduce another licensing regime without clear evidence of its benefits.
The government’s decision not to introduce affiliate licensing is therefore sensible. Our experience suggests that better communication, more effective monitoring and increasingly capable technology offer a more practical route to improving compliance than another layer of administration.
Consumers are unlikely to care whether an affiliate has completed a licensing application, submitted fingerprints or signed another regulatory declaration.
They care whether the information they receive is accurate, the advertising they encounter is responsible, and the gambling operators being promoted are legitimate. Regulation should be designed to achieve that.